



National
Foreign
Assessment
Center

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

~~Secret~~

Latin America Review

12 April 1979

SOURCED

Secret

PA LAR 79-010
12 April 1979

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Copy

143

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

SECRET

25X1

LATIN AMERICA REVIEW

12 April 1979

CONTENTS

Jamaica-USSR: Manley in Moscow [REDACTED] 1

25X1

Prime Minister Manley's five-day visit to the USSR this week will add fuel to the bitter controversy in Jamaica over his growing links with local and foreign Communists. [REDACTED]

25X1

Brazil: Talking Tough, Talking Soft [REDACTED] 4

25X1

The new Figueiredo administration's approach to several major issues--a mixture of toughness and conciliation--has left many Brazilians uncertain of the President's intentions toward political liberalization. [REDACTED]

25X1

Cuba: 1979--Year of Austerity [REDACTED] . . 6

25X1

Low world sugar prices, demographic pressures, and an expanding military establishment are having a measurable effect on the size and shape of the budget. [REDACTED]

25X1



25X1

SECRET

SECRET

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

El Salvador: The Nationalist Democratic
Organization (ORDEN) 14

ORDEN--a progovernment, military-sanctioned
civilian force of perhaps as many as 60,000
campesinos--is one of the most intriguing
and enigmatic of El Salvador's numerous po-
litical, labor, insurgents, and government
groups.

FOR THE RECORD 20

CUBAN CHRONOLOGY 21

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

SECRET

25X1


25X1

Jamaica-USSR: Manley in Moscow

25X1

1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1
Prime Minister Manley's five-day visit to the USSR this week will add fuel to the bitter controversy in Jamaica over his growing links with local and foreign Communists. Despite Manley's high hopes for his official visit, which began on Monday, the trip will probably result at most in modest agreements for reciprocal trade and economic cooperation. The trip may boost the Prime Minister's stock among local radicals, but at the cost of further strain in his relations with Jamaica's moderates, especially in the crucial private sector.

25X1



LEGITIMISING THE UNION!

Kingston Press spoofs Manley's (the bride) trip and his ties to local and international leftists

25X1

*From Jamaica Daily Gleaner, 27 March 1979.

12 April 1979

SECRET

6, 7 The Jamaican Government maintains that President Brezhnev invited Manley to the Kremlin to exchange views on international issues of mutual interest and to develop specific proposals for bilateral economic cooperation and trade. It is more probable, however, that local leftists convinced Manley to request the invitation from the Kremlin--which has actually been slow to respond to Manley's overtures. [REDACTED]

3 The Prime Minister has publicly described the trip as part of his longstanding goal to diversify Jamaica's economic relations. [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] His public assurances, however, have only intensified the growing opposition and hostility of moderate groups critical of the government's improving relations with the USSR. [REDACTED]

7 To the Prime Minister's critics, Manley's pro-Soviet line is evident in his speeches to leftist groups, in the propaganda of government-owned media, and in Jamaica's voting record in the United Nations. The increasingly effective opposition party, the private sector, the independent press, and some church leaders have accused Manley of consciously leading Jamaica toward the "Soviet-Cuban brand" of Communism and have denounced his close collaboration with the island's Communist Party. [REDACTED]

Soviet-Jamaican Relations

6 The charges of Manley's critics are overdrawn. They exaggerate the Prime Minister's ability to influence events in Jamaica, where democratic institutions are still strong. Local political and economic trends now point to the Prime Minister's probable defeat in the election he must call by 1981. The centrist opposition party led successful antigovernment demonstrations in January, and Manley apparently expects more popular protests in the near future. The underlying concern of his opponents is that Manley--with help from the Soviets, Cubans, and local radicals--will try to rig the election or attempt an unconstitutional seizure of power. [REDACTED]

12 April 1979

25X1

25X1

Manley apparently hopes that Soviet aid [redacted] can help prevent his political downfall. Although Western aid to Jamaica has been about \$25 million annually in credits and grants in recent years, the Prime Minister recognizes that it will not be enough to buy the next election for him. [redacted]

25X1

Prospects

The bilateral talks in the Kremlin will have little impact on the Jamaican electorate. The small amount of aid the Soviets have offered to date--less than \$50 million--would if implemented help Manley's position only with the Jamaican left, which is becoming his strongest domestic constituency. [redacted]

The Prime Minister's working-class power base seems likely to continue to erode because of devaluations, sharply rising food prices, chronic shortages, widening labor unrest, and growing unemployment that now affects more than 30 percent of the labor force. Overall, Manley seems willing to risk a continued deterioration of his relations with the private sector--which is now crucial to economic recovery--for the political security he apparently thinks he can get from local radicals [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Brazil: Talking Tough, Talking Soft

25X1

3 After less than a month in office, the Figueiredo administration has approached several major issues with a mixture of toughness and conciliation, leaving many Brazilians uncertain as to the new President's true intentions toward political liberalization.

25X1

1, 3 Last week, for example, the Justice Minister announced an "amnesty" and a return to the direct election of state governors in 1982, when the terms of the appointed incumbents expire. He did not, however, promise direct elections for mayors of state capitals or for the so-called "bionic" senators, and left undefined the nature of the proposed amnesty. The announcement may have been designed to compensate for the regime's relatively tough handling of the metalworkers' strike in Sao Paulo. To end that walkout, which had halted auto production, the regime took over the three unions involved, ousted their leaders, closed the union halls, and made selective arrests. The government seems to have rethought its actions against the unions, however, and has allowed the labor chiefs to continue to exercise de facto leadership and has even praised their moderate behavior.

25X1

1, 3 The regime is talking tough on other issues as well. Opposition politicians have been warned that pushing for a congressional investigation of alleged torture during previous administrations would lead to serious, though undefined, consequences. A national newswriter is already in trouble with the military courts for publishing a series on this subject.

25X1

25X1

The administration probably sees no contradiction between its behavior to date and the promised political liberalization. President Geisel, who began the process of reform, had made progress toward this by the end of

12 April 1979

his term, even though, ironically, he resorted to authoritarian measures along the way. The early moves of the Figueiredo administration seem to follow a similar pattern.

[REDACTED]

In some ways, however, Figueiredo's task will be harder. Geisel's reforms left the regime without the sweeping, dictatorial powers it could once count on, though its authority is still great. Moreover, expectations in all sectors have risen dramatically, and the pace of demands is accelerating. Figueiredo lacks the prestige and ironclad control over the armed forces that Geisel enjoyed and thus must tread more carefully than his predecessor. Finally, the President must hold in reserve a number of symbolic liberalizing moves for strategic use later in his six-year term, when he may well need to assuage a populace far more disgruntled than it is already.

[REDACTED]

12 April 1979

SECRET

25X1

Cuba: 1979--Year of Austerity

Continued low world sugar prices, growing demographic pressures, and an expanding military establishment are exerting a measurable influence on the size and shape of the Cuban budget. The recently approved 1979 budget--only the second to be published in 13 years--indicates that:

- Total government expenditures will increase only 2.7 percent over last year, well below the 10.5 percent annual increase over the past 13 years.
- Outlays for "development of the economy" will decline 3.6 percent in current terms and even more in constant terms.
- Expenditures on social welfare (including public health, education, and housing) are projected to jump 10.5 percent
- Official defense expenditures will rise at least 7.3 percent and possibly more.

The admittedly tight budget and reduced outlays for economic development can only dampen the already bleak prospects for growth, while the increased emphasis on social services will only moderately expand the quality of health care and education and will not begin to satisfy demand in the long-neglected housing sector.

Limited Budget Growth

The Cuban National Assembly has approved a 1979 budget of \$12.4 billion--only 2.7 percent above last year and well below the 10.5 percent average annual increase of the past 13 years. The small increase suggests that continued low world sugar prices are having an adverse effect on economic growth despite significantly greater Soviet aid over the past three years. The 1976-80 Cuban

12 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

Five-Year Plan has been scaled down at least once, and more recently Havana acknowledged that the planned 1979 growth rate will be somewhat below that of 1978.

Cuban Budget Expenditures

	Percent		
	1966	1978	1979
Economic development	36.1	44.0	41.3
Social welfare	34.7	32.9	35.3
Social services, public health, and education	(29.9)	(29.3)	(31.1)
Housing and community services	(4.8)	(3.6)	(4.2)
National defense and public order	7.8	8.6	8.9
Public administration	5.0	5.9	5.5
Other activities	0.0	4.3	4.8
Reserves	10.1	4.3	4.2
Debt service	<u>6.3</u>	<u>0.0</u>	<u>0.0</u>
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0

Total budget revenues are also projected at \$12.4 billion, resulting in a balanced budget. About four-fifths of the revenues have their origins in the central government, with the remainder coming from the operations of the 14 provincial governments and the Isle of Youth. Although details are not available, the sources of the revenues will probably resemble last year's, with major emphasis on profits of state enterprises--the difference between an enterprise's gross earnings and expenditures. State profits are being increasingly emphasized by the cost-conscious Castro government and are consistent with the "rationalization" measures undertaken by Havana over the past several years. Other major sources of revenue include a variety of excise taxes and unspecified nontax income.

12 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

Cuba: Budget Expenditures

Billion 1978 US \$

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Reserves


Other Activities

Defense

Public
Administration

Social Services,
Public Health,
Education, and
Housing

Development of
the Economy



1978

1979

25X1

624942 4-79

12 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

Shifting Priorities

Faced with limited means and monumental needs, Havana is being forced to set priorities in its expenditures, reducing outlays for economic development, public administration, and reserves in order to expand those for social services and defense.

Economic development expenditures, although still the most important category in the centrally planned Cuban economy, will decline both absolutely and relatively. The 3.6 percent reduction in current dollars and even more in constant dollars undoubtedly reflects the forced lowering of capital goods imports from the West and Havana's inability to offset these reductions with increased imports from the USSR and Eastern Europe.

Expenditures on public administration and reserves have also been cut as part of Havana's economic rationalization efforts. The reduction in administrative outlays amounts to 4.3 percent and undoubtedly reflects efforts to streamline the government bureaucracy and reallocate these resources to more productive sectors. Allocations for reserves, which grew rapidly in the 1960s, will fall about 2.2 percent, probably in response to the adoption of more orthodox and comprehensive planning procedures.

On the other hand, Havana will increase expenditures on social welfare by 10.5 percent in keeping with the Cuban Revolution's commitment to public health and education and concomitant pressures from a significantly increased school-aged population stemming from a 1960s "baby boom."

Social services, public health, and education expenditures will rise 9.1 percent. The disproportionately large increase reflects:

- A 5.4 percent rise in school enrollment in the 1978-79 school year.
- The emphasis on higher education, which keeps students in the school system for a longer period of time.
- Plans to triple the number of medical students by 1985.


12 April 1979

SECRET

The emphasis on higher education is aimed primarily at improving the labor force, but the bleak prospects for the economy suggest that Havana may have difficulty assimilating all of the new entrants. A growing proportion of these may be sent overseas as part of Cuba's growing technical aid program in the Third World.

The largest increase is slated for housing and community services--a sector that has been largely ignored by the Castro government until recent years. The 23-percent increase is grossly inadequate to meet Cuba's housing needs, which are far in excess of supply and will continue to grow over the next decade as the relatively young Cuban population--35 percent of the population is under 15 years of age--reaches maturity. Cuba needs to construct 100,000 homes annually over the next decade to satisfy demand, but only 16,700 units were completed in 1978 and only 20,000 are planned for 1979.

Reflecting Cuba's large military presence in Africa and the current modernization of the armed forces, expenditures for defense--the third largest category--will jump significantly. Outlays officially will rise 7.3 percent and perhaps as much as 9.2 percent if the amorphous category of "other activities" contains defense items, as may be the case. Even though the USSR underwrites all of the Cuban Armed Forces' materiel needs, the commitment of some 35,000 Cuban troops to Angola and Ethiopia and the expanding mechanization and mobilization of the Cuban military apparatus have forced Havana to expand its regular military by about one-third and to incur increased support costs.



12 April 1979

25X6

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

25X1

El Salvador: The Nationalist Democratic Organization
(ORDEN) [REDACTED]

The current political, social, and economic turmoil in El Salvador is in part a manifestation of the conflicting goals and interests pursued by the country's numerous political, labor, insurgent, and government groups. One of the most intriguing and enigmatic of these is the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN), a progovernment, military-sanctioned civilian force consisting of perhaps as many as 60,000 campesinos. [REDACTED]

25X1

Initially, ORDEN's primary purpose was to afford the government a disciplined organization in the rural areas that could teach campesinos the fundamentals of democracy, indoctrinate them against the "dangers of Communism," and provide limited social services and assistance programs to the poor. Some members of the political opposition, however, claim that ORDEN increasingly has become an instrument of control for the military-dominated National Conciliation Party (PCN). [REDACTED]

25X1

ORDEN patrols have been present at many polling places in recent elections and seemingly have played a part in the fraudulent practices employed by the PCN to retain power. In addition, ORDEN members allegedly have engaged in repressive, paramilitary tactics to harass the Catholic Church and various other "antigovernment" groups. There has also been periodic speculation that the military could be grooming the organization as a political party to replace the increasingly controversial and unpopular PCN. [REDACTED]

Historical Perspective

The history of ORDEN is reflected largely in the career of its founder, Col. Jose Alberto Medrano, who was director of the Salvadoran Intelligence Agency in the mid-1960s. On orders from then President Rivera, Medrano utilized his network of intelligence agents to set up a national organization as a propaganda counterweight to Communist groups operating throughout the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

12 April 1979

SECRET

Rivera soon realized, however, the key role that the rapidly developing ORDEN could play in the electoral process. Although ORDEN was structured like a paramilitary unit and initially recruited many of its members from the ranks of former national guardsmen, it performed more like a political organization at the outset and reportedly carried the burden of campaigning for the PCN in the 1966 legislative/municipal and 1967 presidential elections. [REDACTED]

By the time Gen. Sanchez Hernandez assumed the presidency in 1967, ORDEN's membership had grown to around 10,000. Most of those who joined did so out of patriotism, a desire to take advantage of the educational and civil opportunities ORDEN seemed to offer, or because they wished to ingratiate themselves with the increasingly powerful PCN. [REDACTED]

Medrano's national prominence in the late 1960s and his political contacts through ORDEN imbued him with presidential aspirations. His premature efforts to secure the PCN candidacy for the 1972 election enraged President Sanchez, however, and caused Medrano's fall from political grace. President Sanchez decided that ORDEN's strength and political potential warranted placing the organization under the direct command of the casa presidencial. By the time he left office, Sanchez had ousted Medrano, completed the institutionalization of ORDEN, and established a chain of command that subsequently was inherited by Presidents Molina (1972-77) and Romero (1977-82). [REDACTED]

ORDEN's Structure and Membership

ORDEN's leaders are appointed by the President and high-level military officials. These appointments extend all the way down to unit commanders in each of the country's 2,261 cantons. [REDACTED]

Although President Romero is the titular head of ORDEN, the organization is the responsibility of the chief control officer, Col. Luis Benedicto Rodriguez, who also serves as chief of the presidential staff. Actual administration is probably in the hands of retired Col. Antonio Ramirez Pena, the executive control officer. [REDACTED]

12 April 1979

2 A two-man team of comandantes departamentales, or liaison officers, is assigned to each of the 14 departments. They are in direct radio communication with the casa presidencial and convey requirements and orders to the comandantes locales--army noncommissioned officers (usually sergeants) who command local ORDEN units. [REDACTED]

25X1

2 Formal recruitment into ORDEN comes after regular military service or through government employment in service industries--such as road construction, maintenance, and garbage collection. Informal recruitment, which accounts for the majority of ORDEN's cadre, consists of campesinos who indicate an interest in serving on one of the patrullas cantonales, or canton patrols. [REDACTED]

25X1

Three basic categories of campesinos join ORDEN:

- Peguenos propietarios--owners of small plots of land, accounting for no more than 15 percent of ORDEN's membership.
- 2 -- Colonos--permanent employees of larger haciendas or fincas, comprising about 40 percent of ORDEN's membership.
- Campesinos itinerantes--itinerant workers who constitute the rest of ORDEN's membership.

25X1

2 The campesinos join for a variety of reasons. Perhaps the most significant is that an ORDEN member may carry arms--pistols and machetes--which are important symbols of machismo. According to the political opposition, ORDEN members also have a tacit immunity from arrest for certain petty crimes. In addition, ORDEN personnel apparently do not have to pay taxes, and they receive other special benefits and status unavailable to nonmembers. [REDACTED]

25X1

2 Within each of the 261 municipios there are two roughly parallel structures--a civil action, exclusively ORDEN group supervised by the mayor, and a military unit of the Servicios Territoriales (the Salvadoran military reserve structure) under the control of an active-duty noncommissioned officer. Confusion about these two groups arises from the fact that the same men frequently

12 April 1979

belong to both units and even perform some of the same functions--conducting classes in civics, holding pro-government meetings, and carrying out limited security duties. Both groups have approximately 15 to 20 members, but the military-led wing is considered to be the more prestigious. There is one ORDEN patrol of some 10 to 20 recruits in each of the 2,261 cantons. This means a range, therefore, of some 30,000 to 60,000 ORDEN members scattered throughout the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

The Role ORDEN Plays

At the national level, ORDEN publishes a magazine filled with pictures of members and government officials meeting to discuss civismo, democracia, and nacionalismo--the ideological cornerstones of the organization. There are also photographs of sporting events, youth associations, and festive gatherings that ORDEN sponsors and supports on what apparently is a small annual budget. In addition, press coverage is frequently afforded to ORDEN activities such as the donation of an old sewing machine to a rural home economics course. [REDACTED]

25X1

At the local level, ORDEN patrols are called on to quell minor disturbances, particularly if a regular national police or army unit is unavailable. ORDEN members reportedly have also been used on occasion to augment army platoons. [REDACTED]

25X1

ORDEN's real significance is not in this rather narrow, overt role, but in the more questionable, underlying role it reputedly plays. Some in El Salvador--particularly among the legal opposition and certain leftist groups--claim that ORDEN participates in electoral fraud on behalf of the PCN and that the organization is in reality a paramilitary, antirevolutionary strike force trained by the National Guard. It has also been alleged that elements of ORDEN, either in conjunction with legally constituted security forces or acting on their own initiative, have taken violent, repressive actions against church, campesino, and labor groups in the countryside. [REDACTED]

25X1

Several privately funded groups concerned with charges of human rights violations have looked into these accusations. Their reports--although partly based on questionable evidence and the testimony of secondhand witnesses--

12 April 1979

SECRET

point to ORDEN as the primary factor in many of the repressive acts committed in the country over the last several years: unexplained disappearances, assassinations of Catholic priests, the murder of political opposition members, and the beating and intimidation of voters seeking to cast a ballot for opposition parties.

There have also been instances in which violence that reportedly occurred between members of ORDEN and antigovernment factions was not related to political or organizational causes, but resulted solely from personal differences arising over women or money. Moreover, ORDEN may have received the blame for certain heavyhanded, repressive activities when some of its members--who also happen to occupy simultaneous posts in the Servicios Territoriales--were acting under orders as military reservists.

Assessment

The military government's ability to manipulate and misuse ORDEN may be circumscribed by certain factors. First, ORDEN is both a highly visible and highly regarded institution. Despite its limited capabilities, it apparently has benefited a number of people and has earned the goodwill of a large segment of society. The government will, therefore, be somewhat cautious about how and where it employs the organization. Second, ORDEN members probably will do the government's bidding only up to a point. ORDEN recruits are also members of the community in which they serve and are mindful of the need not to alienate their fellow citizens.

It is likely that President Romero and his successor will continue using ORDEN primarily as a political organization--an informal, rural affiliate of the PCN and a vehicle for dispensing propaganda to, and maintaining an element of political control over, the rural masses. In this context, ORDEN can be expected to have a role in future, fraudulent elections.

The outlook for ORDEN as a security force is somewhat less certain. Obviously, the military government perceives a threat from a variety of groups and has undoubtedly tried surreptitiously on occasion to suppress such groups. ORDEN forces have probably been used for this purpose in the past and may be utilized again.

12 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

If a nationwide resistance movement develops against the government, it seems improbable that ORDEN's full organizational force would align itself with the military. Given a scenario of less than widespread revolution but one of increasing rural restiveness, it is more likely--and perhaps potentially more dangerous--that certain ORDEN patrols will initiate their own repressive acts. It is also possible that the military government could single out certain fervent ORDEN members and form them into special civilian platoons willing to carry out highly repressive acts on behalf of, yet unattributable to, the government.



12 April 1979

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

CUBAN CHRONOLOGY (U)

For March 1979

- 1 March Cuba and Ethiopia sign labor cooperation agreement. Cuban labor experts will study ways to restructure Ethiopian wage and labor practices along "socialist guidelines."
- Lionel Soto, PCC Central Committee member, heads party delegation to Ireland.
- Fidel Castro addresses first contingent of Che Guevara teachers' detachment to return from Angolan service. Castro says second group will serve two-year tours.
- 1-5 March Army Gen. Raul Castro, leading military delegation, visits Sofia, Bulgaria. Meets with Chairman Zhivkov on 2 March. Official visit ends on 5 March, but Castro and wife remain in Bulgaria on vacation until 19 March.
- 3 March Benin Politburo member Adho Boko Ignase meets with Blas Roca, chairman of People's National Assembly, to learn how the Assembly operates.
- Raul Roa, Cuban UN Ambassador, tells Security Council that the international community should give moral, political, financial, and material support to the Zimbabwe patriots.

12 April 1979

SECRET

- 5-9 March I. V. Arkhipov, deputy chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, visits Cuba. Met by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. Meets with Fidel Castro on 9 March. Arkhipov is in Cuba to attend ninth session of USSR-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission.
- 6 March Ethiopian President Mengistu visits Cuban construction site in Ethiopia accompanied by PCC Central Committee member Raul Curbelo.
- Cuban UN mission makes public a letter sent by them to the Security Council denouncing Israeli mistreatment of Palestinians.
- 6-8 March Ninth meeting of USSR-Cuba Intergovernmental Commission held in Havana. Meeting covers economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. Protocol signed 8 March.
- 10 March Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Rene Anillo meets with East German Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer in East Berlin.
- Council of State appoints Humberto Perez a vice president of the Council of Ministers. He will continue as president of the central planning board.
- 11 March The Cubans working in Vietnam attend solidarity activity at Ho Chi Minh Internationalist Group headquarters. They will remain in Vietnam and help defend it.
- 12 March Vice President Flavio Bravo attends inauguration of new Venezuelan President Luis Herrera.

12 April 1979

SECRET

12-13 March First congress of the Federation of University Students (FEU) is held in Havana. Representatives of 50 international youth organizations, 480 delegates, and 3,000 guests attend.

14 March Fidel Castro addresses the closing session of FEU congress.

 Central Committee member Jaime Crombet is named Cuban Ambassador to Angola.

 Cuban Foreign Minister Malmierca is interviewed by Prensa Latina. He says it is possible that Iran will join nonaligned group.

15 March Commentary carried on Havana Domestic Television says that the coup in Grenada is "a victory for the people."

16 March Council of State designates Fermin Rodriguez Ambassador to Cyprus.

 Fidel Castro meets with Bashir Mustafa Sayed, Deputy Secretary General of Polisario Front, and his delegation visiting Cuba.

 Sixth congress of the Continental Organization of Latin American Students (OCLAE) is held in Havana. Representatives from 29 countries and 43 youth organizations attend.

 Chairman Zhivkov meets with Raul Castro in Sofia. Bilateral cooperation and international problems are discussed.

17 March Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa accuses China of betraying the principles of Marxism-Leninism in the Security Council.

12 April 1979

17 March Granma has long article critical of Middle East peace accord and the US role in it.

19 March Fidel Castro sends congratulatory message to new Algerian Prime Minister Mohamed 'Abd al-Ghani. He stresses close relations between Cuba and Algeria.

21 March Fidel Castro presents Cuba's 20th anniversary medal to outgoing Soviet Ambassador Nikita Tolubeyev.

 Raul Leon Torras, head of Cuba's National Bank, meets with French Economy Minister Rene Monory in Paris to discuss bilateral relations.

 "Official sources" in Havana deny that Cuban troops are present in Kampuchea. They say that Chinese have spread these rumors as part of a campaign against Cuba.

21-23 March Meeting of public health experts of nonaligned countries is held in Havana. Delegations from 29 countries attend.

22 March A delegation from the Iraq Peoples Army visiting Cuba at the invitation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution tours Cienfuegos Province.

23 March Fidel Castro speaks at dedication of a hospital in the city of Cienfuegos. He lists countries where Cuban medical personnel are serving, including with Polisario forces.

24 March Cuban UN Ambassador Raul Roa asks the Security Council to condemn South Africa for its continued aggression against Angola.

12 April 1979

SECRET

24 March	The first group of 370 Mozambican students (of a more than 1,000-member contingent) arrives on the Isle of Youth.
26 March	Delegation of US health experts, led by US surgeon general, arrives in Cuba at invitation of Cuban Public Health Minister.
26-30 March	Polish Premier Jaroszewicz pays official visit to Cuba. Greeted by Fidel Castro, who presents him with the Jose Marti order.
27 March	Cuba and Panama sign scientific and technical cooperation agreement in the areas of agriculture and the sugarcane industry.
27-29 March	Carlos Rafael Rodriguez attends CEMA Executive Committee meeting in Moscow.
28 March	Interior Minister Sergio del Valle presides over the celebration in Havana of the third anniversary of the victory of the Angolan people.
30 March	Dr. Ziolo Marinello delivers invitation from Fidel Castro to Sri Lanka President Junius Jayewardene to attend nonaligned summit. This is the first invitation issued. Cuban Ambassador to Vietnam Melba Hernandez presents her credentials to the President of the Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Council and is accredited to Kampuchea. Council of State designates Julio Garcia Olivera Ambassador to East Germany.
31 March	Council of State designates Carlos Alonso Moreno Ambassador to Finland.

12 April 1979

SECRET

SECRET

31 March

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez arrives in East Berlin to attend Cuba - East Germany Intergovernmental Commission meeting.

Cuba is elected to the chairmanship of the Group of 77 for a three-month period.

Algerian Construction Minister arrives in Cuba for working visit.

The above article is Unclassified.

12 April 1979

SECRET

Secret

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Secret

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2

Next 9 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00912A001000010024-2